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INTRODUCTION
This panel has been asked to consider whether "the Constitution [is]
responsible for electoral dysfunction."' My answer is no. The electoral process
undeniably falls well short of our aspirations, but it strikes me that we should
look to the Supreme Court for an accounting before blaming the Constitution
for the deeply unsatisfactory condition in which we find ourselves.
More specifically, a good deal of what might be labeled electoral
dysfunction stems from quite recent decisions from the Roberts Court. I focus
on three representative cases, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission2
and Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,3 which
invalidated campaign finance regulations, and Shelby County v. Holder,4 which
vastly limited the Voting Rights Act.5 Needless to say, these decisions are not
responsible for every flaw in the electoral process. They are, nevertheless, the
source of significant and unnecessary electoral problems. As important, they
capture the singular perspective with which the Roberts Court views the
electoral process and the Court's role in policing it. I suggest that it is this
perspective that goes a good distance in explaining why contemporary
Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
See America's Political Dysfunction: Constitutional Connections, Causes, and Cures,
Bos. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, http://www.bu.edu/law/events/upcoming/documents/America%19
sPoliticalDysfunctionConferenceSchedule.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/D7VG-5MLD.
2 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
4 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
Other candidates for this list arguably include Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (upholding voter identification law as facially constitutional),
which, in important ways, both propelled Shelby County and heightened its consequences;
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007), which fueled Citizens United;
and Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008), which provided the foundation for Arizona Free
Enterprise.
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electoral processes take the form they do, and, accordingly, why the Court and
not the Constitution is most responsible for that form.
My argument is that the Roberts Court has become - and perhaps has
always been6 - deeply skeptical of electoral regulations that attempt to displace
certain traditional forms of political participation. It sees a good deal of
contemporary electoral regulation as impermissibly redistributive and
needlessly disruptive of the type of political participation that would exist in its
absence. The Court, moreover, tends to view the type of participation that is
displaced as a neutral baseline against which to gauge challenged regulations
rather than itself the product of affirmative regulation. Put differently, the
present Court confronts contemporary efforts to regulate the electoral process
much like the Lochner Court7 approached progressive wage and hour
legislation a century ago.8 In fact, much of what the Roberts Court has been up
to in the electoral arena may be explained by an influential understanding of
the Lochner era.9
To be sure, labeling recent decisions Lochnerian in sensibility is a
predictable move.' 0 Critics reliably invoke Lochner whenever the Court deems
legislation they favor to be unconstitutional, and the charge has been lodged in
the election law context with particular vigor." And yet, recent work of the
Roberts Court differs both in degree and in kind from the election law cases
that have prompted the charge previously. I will explain why after first
discussing the ways in which Citizens United, Arizona Free Enterprise Club,
6 Five years ago, I understood the stance of the Roberts Court differently. See Ellen D.
Katz, Withdrawal: The Roberts Court and the Retreat from Election Law, 93 MINN. L. REv.
1615, 1616 (2009) (suggesting that the Roberts Court was seeking "to avoid active federal
engagement with the state-created rules regulating democratic participation"). Whether or
not that understanding was wrong at the time, and, in hindsight, it might have been, it does
not capture the approach of the Court today.
7 See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251 (1918); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
8 For discussions analogizing Citizens United to Lochner, see, for example, Robert L.
Kerr, Naturalizing the Artificial Citizen: Repeating Lochner's Error in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission, 15 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 311 (2010); Lawrence Lessig,
Democracy After Citizens United, Bos. REv. (Sept. 4, 2010), http://bostonreview.net/lessig-
democracy-after-citizens-united, archived at http://perma.cc/UNH3-HKKV.
I See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 875 (1987); see also
David E. Bernstein, Lochner's Legacy's Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REv. 1 (2003) (offering a
different analysis of the Lochner era).
1o See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the Taft
Court Era, 78 B.U. L. REv. 1489, 1494 (1998) ("The ghost of Lochner has haunted efforts at
aggressive judicial protection of constitutional rights since the New Deal, even when such
protection has been informed by a liberal agenda, such as in the days of the Warren
Court.").
" See infra Part II.
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and Shelby County are similar in structure and motivation, and why these
similarities support the Lochner label.
I. THE COURT, NOT THE CONSTITUTION
Citizens United, Arizona Free Enterprise Club, and Shelby County resemble
one another in several respects. All three decisions refused to defer to
legislative findings and judgments, mistrusted the motives underlying the
challenged legislation, and confidently vindicated a constitutionally grounded
right that had not previously been understood to be as robust and absolute as
these holdings suggest. These similarities in structure, moreover, were fueled
by the Court's deep skepticism about electoral rules that displace particular,
traditional forms of political participation and alter the balance of power those
forms would have produced.
Consider, first, Citizens United, which scrapped key provisions of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)12 and precedent that
supported them.13 The provisions at issue prevented corporations and unions
from using general treasury funds for "electioneering communication," a
practice the BCRA broadly defined to include broadcast and related types of
communication that mentioned candidates for federal office during specified
periods.14 Congress meant for these provisions to rein in so-called issue
advocacy, namely, advertisements that were intended to endorse or condemn
candidates, but did so without using words like "elect" or "vote" and hence fell
outside the preexisting regulatory framework.15
Congress's effort was for naught. The Citizens United Court understood the
BCRA's limits on corporate-funded issue advocacy to be a ban on speech,
rather than a regulation of it, and a ban made worse by the regime's selective
reach.16 The Court, moreover, suggested that the problem Congress intended
the BCRA provisions to target - namely, preferential access and the
opportunity to influence - might not even be a problem at all.17 In his opinion
for the Court, Justice Kennedy wrote that the goals of combatting corruption
and the appearance of it, which had long served as justifications for regulation
in the campaign finance arena, were "limited to quid pro quo corruption."18
Even if corporate independent expenditures could lead to ingratiation and
preferential access - something Justice Kennedy doubted - "[i]ngratiation and
access . . . are not corruption."' 9 This rendered most of the record supporting
12 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 8, 18, 28, 36,
and 47 U.S.C.).
" See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
14 See id. at 321.
15 See id at 439-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16 See id. at 339 (plurality opinion).
17 See id. at 359.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 360.
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the BCRA irrelevant, and left Congress without authority to address issues of
influence, access, and the appearance it fostered, at least in the manner it had
done.
Most critical for present purposes, Citizens United scrapped the core
premise undergirding restrictions of corporate political activity. For decades,
the "special advantages" state laws grant to corporations - namely "limited
liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and
distribution of assets" 20 - had been understood to justify restrictions on
corporate activity connected with elections. As then-Justice Rehnquist
observed back in 1978, one "might reasonably" conclude that "the blessings" a
state gives a corporation to "enhance its efficiency as an economic entity"
might "pose special dangers in the political sphere." 21 Justice White added that
"[t]he State need not permit its own creation to consume it."22
To be sure, both Justices were dissenting at the time, but it is worth recalling
that the majority in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti did not question
the fundamental premise Justices Rehnquist and White described, namely, that
corporations were artificial, state-created institutions vested by the state with
special privileges that justified additional regulation in the political sphere.23
The majority never doubted that the political activity of corporations could be
regulated more extensively than the political activities of individuals. 24 Instead,
the Bellotti majority crafted what it described as a limited exception to that
principle. It made clear that it was not holding that corporations themselves
enjoyed First Amendment rights, but instead that the First Amendment
interests of others would be served by allowing limited corporate expenditures
in connection with referenda. 25
As has been widely observed, Citizens United disregarded these carefully
crafted limits. 2 6 The Court read Bellotti to support precisely what it disavowed,
namely, that a corporation is entitled to make unrestricted expenditures in
connection with any election, not just a referendum, and that a corporation
possesses a First Amendment right to do so. 27 In so doing, Citizens United
20 Id. at 351 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59
(1990)); see also First Nat'1 Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 809 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting).
21 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 825-26 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 809 (White, J., dissenting).
23 See id.
24 Id. at 789 (majority opinion) ("[C]orporations are wealthy and powerful and their
views may drown out other points of view.").
25 Id at 776 ("The Constitution often protects interests broader than those of the party
seeking their vindication.").
26 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 442 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("The only thing about Bellotti that could not be clearer is that it declined to adopt the
majority's position."); Kerr, supra note 8, at 348 (observing that Citizens United
"mischaracterizes" Bellotti).
27 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 346-47.
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transformed the state-granted "blessings" corporations enjoy into inherent,
even pre-legal attributes of these institutions. No longer would these "special
advantages" provide cause to regulate corporate political activity, or, indeed,
treat corporations differently from individuals engaged in such activity. The
Court said so explicitly, noting these advantages "do[] not suffice to allow" the
disputed regulations. Citizens United thereby recognized that corporations
enjoy robust First Amendment rights similar to, and perhaps even coextensive
with, those enjoyed by individuals.28
Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett29 followed
Citizens United in form and inspiration. The decision struck down Arizona's
Citizens Clean Elections Act, a public funding regime that provided candidates
who opted to participate an initial outlay of public funds to conduct their
campaigns, and additional matching funds if a privately funded candidate or
political committee spent more than the publicly financed candidate's initial
allotment.3 0
Chief Justice Roberts' opinion for the Court held that this regime penalized
both privately funded candidates and PACs. Because privately funded
candidates who chose to speak through spending triggered a subsidy for their
opponents,31 and because that subsidy in tum might lead both these candidates
and PACs to limit their spending or modify their message, the regime imposed
"a special and potentially significant burden" on privately funded candidates
and PACs. 32
The Chief Justice, moreover, was not convinced that the regime served
Arizona's interest in combatting corruption.33 He observed that Arizona had
already placed strict limits on campaign contributions, the practice most
closely associated with quid pro quo corruption, while a good deal of private
funding involved independent expenditures or contributions by candidates to
their own campaigns, practices that were not seen to raise corruption concerns
at all. 34 To the extent that the matching funds provision might encourage
candidates to accept public funding and thereby avoid the opportunities for
corruption fundraising invites, Chief Justice Roberts held that serving
anticorruption interests "indirectly" did not justify the burden the regime
placed on privately funded candidates and PACs. 35
28 See id at 314.
29 Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
30 See id at 2828.
31 Id. at 2821.
32 Id. at 2818.
3 Id. at 2826.
34 Id. at 2826-27.
3 Id. at 2827 ("But the fact that burdening constitutionally protected speech might
indirectly serve the State's anticorruption interest, by encouraging candidates to take public
financing, does not establish the constitutionality of the matching funds provision.").
2014] 701
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Animating much of Arizona Free Enterprise Club was the Court's belief
that Arizona was less interested in battling corruption than in "leveling the
playing field."36 Equalization, of course, has long been anathema in realm the
campaign finance regulation,37 but Arizona Free Enterprise Club took that
aversion to a new height. Whereas efforts to cap spending have previously
prompted charges of leveling, the Arizona regime allowed privately funded
candidates and PACs to raise and spend unlimited funds.38 The "leveling"
charge, accordingly, rested not on a spending limit, but, instead, on the chain
of events private spending triggered under the regime. And what it triggered
was an award of matching funds that gave publicly funded candidates a benefit
they would not otherwise have received, and a benefit that might alter or
distort private spending and the speech private spending would have
produced. 39
Reporting and disclosure requirements arguably shape private spending and
resulting speech in a similar manner. Arizona Free Enterprise Club, however,
made clear that the Court thought the Arizona regime differed in legally
significant ways from such requirements. As a result, the case did not vindicate
the right to speak without consequence, or even without state-authorized
consequence. Instead, it recognized the right of privately funded speakers to
spend and speak without triggering a "windfall" to their opponents or
distorting their own speech to prevent that windfall. 40 Put differently, the Court
found that the regime unlawfully distorted speech that would have occurred in
its absence by providing unearned benefits to some speakers but not others.
That conclusion assumed the existence of an unregulated (or, perhaps,
differently regulated) electoral arena in which speech would not be distorted
and windfalls not bestowed.
Shelby County v. Holder^' addressed a different aspect of the political
process and undeniably distinct concerns. Nevertheless, the decision was
similarly animated by the Court's sense that the challenged regime
impermissibly burdened some participants in the electoral arena and provided
others unearned benefits.
Shelby County specifically invalidated the coverage formula set forth in
section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), thereby rendering inoperative the
VRA's section 5 preclearance regime.42 Much of the debate preceding the
36 Id. at 2825.
3 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1975).
31 See Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2815.
39 See id
40 See id. at 2822.
41 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
42 Section 4(b) of the VRA "covered" jurisdictions if they utilized a "test or device" as a
prerequisite to voting and had low levels of voter participation on specified dates between
1964 and 1972. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(b), 79 Stat. 437,
438 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2012)). Once covered jurisdictions could
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Court's decision in Shelby County focused on the conditions for political
participation in places subject to that coverage formula. No one disputed that
these conditions had improved markedly since Congress first crafted the statute
and that the VRA itself was largely responsible for these improvements.43
What was disputed was the extent to which these improvements were
dependent on the VRA's continued operation and the degree of backsliding
that would occur if the regime were scrapped. Justice Ginsburg's dissent
argued vociferously that the VRA provided necessary protection and that
significant backsliding would occur in its absence.44
One of the curious facets of Shelby County is that Chief Justice Roberts'
majority opinion did not challenge this argument. Instead, the Chief Justice
concluded that the discrimination documented in the congressional record and
described by Justice Ginsburg was legally insufficient to justify the statute's
continued regional application.45 As explanation, he observed that this
discrimination was not as severe as it was when Congress first crafted the
regime in 1965; that it had not led Congress to alter the statute's pre-existing
coverage formula; and that it encompassed subjects different from the ones that
Congress listed in the coverage formula when it first subjected places to the
regime's requirements.46
I explain elsewhere why these observations, all of which are true, should
have been insufficient to render preclearance obsolete - and indeed should
have been irrelevant - under applicable doctrine that the Shelby County
majority did not purport to displace.47 For present purposes, however, the
doctrinal inadequacy of these observations matters less than what they expose
about the Court's stance with regard to the VRA's role in the electoral process
and about Congress' power to address ongoing discrimination in voting in the
matter that it did.
Shelby County held that the regional operation of the preclearance regime
contravened the equal sovereignty doctrine by imposing unjustified burdens on
no longer use their test or device and could not implement any electoral changes without
first showing that the proposed change would be nondiscriminatory. Id § 5. This
preclearance obligation applied only to jurisdictions covered by section 4(b). See id. As a
result, eliminating section 4(b) dissolved all existing obligations to seek preclearance. It did
not strike down section 5, and it is a possible that a new trigger might restore the regime in
more limited ways. See H.R. 3899, 113th Cong. (2014) (VRA Amendments).
43 See, e.g., Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625-26 ("Nearly 50 years later, things have
changed dramatically . . . [t]hose conclusions are not outs alone. Congress said the same
when it reauthorized the Act in 2006."); Brief for Petitioner at 9-12, Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct.
2612 (No. 12-96).
44 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2632 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
45 See id. at 2625 (majority opinion).
46 Id. at 2629-31.
47 See Ellen D. Katz, What Was Wrong with the Record?, 12 ELECTION L.J. 329, 330
(2013).
2014] 703
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
public actors in some states but not others. 48 As others have explained, this
holding rested on an unprecedented reading of the equal sovereignty doctrine
and one that may well have repercussions in other contexts.49 Whatever its
merits and lasting effects, however, that reading provided what the Court was
looking for, namely, a convenient means to terminate the regional application
of the preclearance regime.
And the Court wanted preclearance to end. While it had long viewed the
regime's regionally applicable burden-shifting requirements as an
"exceptional" and "extraordinary" 50 remedy, it has more recently become
convinced that the regime operated as a source of unjust enrichment to its
beneficiaries. By the time it decided Shelby County, a majority of the Court no
longer viewed preclearance as a vehicle to make victims of undeniable
discrimination whole, but saw it instead as a device that placed a host of
interested parties, victims included, in a decidedly better position than they
would have been had the discrimination never occurred.5
Justice Scalia captured this sensibility when he characterized the VRA as "a
racial entitlement" at oral argument in Shelby County.52 Chief Justice Roberts
did so as well in the part of his Shelby County opinion that described the 2006
VRA amendment that overruled Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board.53 The
Chief Justice saw the amendment as proof of congressional overreach in that it
was designed to "prohibit laws that could have favored [minority voters] but
did not do so because of a discriminatory purpose."54 Consider the words
"could have favored." Far from inartful drafting, they imply that invidious
discrimination is not always damaging to minority voters. Notably, the Bossier
Parish School Board had adopted a districting plan that it avowedly designed
to prevent the election of a black representative.55 Shelby County suggested
48 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627 ("Racial disparity in those numbers was
compelling evidence justifying the preclearance remedy and the coverage formula.").
49 See id at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Whose Term Was It? A Look Back at the
Supreme Court, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (July 5, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/07/05/1987083
25/whose-term-was-it-a-look-back-at-the-supreme-court, archived at http://perma.cc/8HTB-
Q5D8 ("There's no requirement in the Constitution to treat all states the same . . . [i]t might
be an attractive principle, but it doesn't seem to be in the Constitution." (quoting Professor
Michael McConnell)).
so See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 501 (1997); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1965).
5 Ellen D. Katz, Justice Ginsburg's Umbrella, in A NATION OF WIDENING
OPPORTUNITEs? THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FIFTY (Samuel Bagenstos & Ellen D. Katz eds.,
forthcoming 2014).
52 Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 12-96)
(statement of Scalia, J.) (suggesting that the VRA is a "racial entitlement" and "[t]here are
certain districts in the House that are black districts by law just about now").
s3 Bossier Parish Sch. Bd, 528 U.S. 320.
54 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2626-27 (emphasis added).
ss See Jurisdictional Statement at 8, Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (No. 98-405)
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that such unconstitutional conduct was of little consequence, as all it did was
block implementation of electoral rules "that could have favored" minority
voters. The broader suggestion is that unconstitutional discrimination does not
always deny minority voters an equal opportunity to participate in the political
process, and that in some circumstances simply denies them preferential
treatment. That suggestion propelled the Court's conviction that the VRA's
preclearance regime had become a source of unwarranted preferential
treatment and hence something to discard.
In this sense, Shelby County followed directly from Arizona Free Enterprise
Club and Citizens United. All three decisions deemed efforts to regulate the
electoral process impermissibly disruptive of the balance of power that would
have prevailed in their absence. Citizens United scrapped the idea that the
"special advantages" corporations enjoy provide cause to limit corporate
campaign expenditures or otherwise treat corporations differently from
individuals in this arena. Arizona Free Enterprise Club thought Arizona's
experiment with public funding provided "windfall[s]" that distorted political
debate because of the way it responded to spending by privately funded
candidates and PACs. And Shelby County understood the VRA's regionally
applicable burden-shifting requirements less as a remedy for past
discrimination than as a source of unjust enrichment for its beneficiaries. In
short, all three decisions envisioned the existence of an electoral process that,
absent the challenged regulations, would not be distorted by windfalls or
special advantages or electoral rules that favored particular constituencies.
This vision ignores the fact that, as the authors of a leading casebook have
argued, any democratic political order must operate through preexisting laws,
rules, and institutions, and that democracy does not exist, in any meaningful
sense, "prior to and independent of the specific institutional forms in which it
happens to be embodied at any particular time and place."56 This means that
there is no neutral or natural baseline of political participation against which to
gauge contemporary electoral regulations.
The Court's suggestion that there is resembles and arguably replicates the
error long identified as the defining marker of the Lochner era. An influential
view of that period posits that the Lochner Court erroneously viewed market
practices at common law as a neutral, prepolitical baseline against which to
measure the constitutionality of new regulation.57 The problem, of course, was
that this baseline was far from neutral, and, instead, was itself a legal construct
that reflected the "existing distributions of wealth and entitlements."s
("There was evidence that several Board members preferred the [redistricting plan with all
white-majority districts] because they did not want black representation on the Board. Board
member Barry Musgrove said that 'the Board was "hostile" toward the idea of a black
majority district."').
s ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 1 (4th ed. 2012).
* Sunstein, supra note 9, at 882.
5 Id
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Similarly, striking down contemporary electoral regulations does not restore
a neutral political arena in which there are no windfalls, debate is not distorted,
and favored (and disfavored) treatment does not occur. Entitlements, to be
sure, are dislodged, but other ones are revived as a consequence. Electoral
regulations, in particular, cannot help but favor some over others because,
apart from a few defining elements, there is no neutral baseline that defines
what a democratic political process must look like. Accordingly, scrapping the
core provisions of campaign finance law and the VRA because they bestow
preferential treatment does not restore neutrality, but instead simply substitutes
one set of entitlements for another.
That recognition hardly means that electoral regulations should be immune
from review, but it does (or at least should) require a different sort of analysis
as to whether a challenged regulation fails to past muster. Preferential
treatment is only preferential when compared to something else, and that
something else needs to be examined critically to ensure the entitlements being
vindicated warrant vindication.
II. THE ROBERTS COURT AND ITS PREDECESSORS
Critics predictably invoke Lochner whenever the Court strikes down
legislation they favor, and the charge has been lodged in the election law
context with some frequency. Nevertheless, recent work from the Roberts
Court differs both in degree and in kind from the types of cases that have
provoked the charge previously.
Buckley v. Valeo,59 for instance, has been described as the "direct heir to
Lochner."60 This description stems from the reason the Court offered when it
struck down new caps on campaign expenditures that were intended to prevent
big spenders from dominating political discourse and thereby inhibiting diverse
and balanced debate. In striking down the caps, the Buckley Court famously
stated that "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment." 61 The ruling is seen as Lochnerian
because it posits that "the state must take disparities in wealth, and the
existence of some with more 'voice' than others, as part of nature for which the
government bears no responsibility." 62
Buckley has few defenders today, both because of its rejection of
equalization as a justification for regulation and because of the untenable line it
drew between contribution and expenditure limits. 63 Still, one need not
5 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
o Sunstein, supra note 9, at 884.
61 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
62 Sunstein, supra note 9, at 884.
63 See, e.g., FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 438, 443 n.8
(2001); id. at 465 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Richard L. Hasen, Money Grubbers, SLATE (Jan.
21, 2010), http://www.slate.com/articles/newsand politics/jurisprudence/2010/01/money
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celebrate Buckley to recognize the ways in which the ruling was more limited
than a good deal of contemporary precedent. Buckley, for example, did not call
into question longstanding restrictions on corporate and union political
activity. The decision, moreover, upheld significant contribution limits,
reporting and disclosure requirements, a public-funding system, and, most
notably, non-negligible congressional power to craft and shape these measures.
All the while, Buckley never suggested that these measures, individually or
collectively, might provide windfalls or otherwise favor some participants in
the electoral process over others, or that they might significantly distort or
diminish speech.
Decisions like Citizens United, Arizona Free Enterprise Club, and Shelby
County expressed far more skepticism about the regulatory projects they
confronted. These decisions voiced the Justices' concerns about windfalls,
preferential treatment, and unjust enrichment; they mistrusted the motives
underlying the challenged legislation; and they suggested that the regulatory
projects as a whole were fundamentally flawed." Put differently, these
decisions retained the elements of Buckley that were most Lochnerian while
setting up the foundation to discard the elements that were not.
These recent decisions, however, are not simply more Lochnerian than their
predecessors. They also differ in kind from a set of election law decisions that
have previously prompted charges of Lochner's resurrection. Specifically, and
not surprisingly, they differ notably from the election law jurisprudence of the
Warren Court.
This earlier precedent is associated with Lochner because it aggressively
displaced state election laws and did so based on understandings of the
Constitution that were not easily grounded in text or history.65 From the
reapportionment revolution 66 to the invalidation of the poll tax67 to the
recognition of voting as a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny,68 the
Warren Court repeatedly scrapped state laws that would have easily survived
more deferential review. The Court's reliance on the Equal Protection Clause
rather than the Due Process Clause did little to insulate these holdings from the
Lochner charge. 69
grubbers.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WM76-B6EM.
' See supra Part I.
65 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf Legal Indeterminancy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 875, 880-81 (2003) (questioning inter alia "how we can justify decisions like ...
Reynolds v. Sims ... without also justifying decisions like Lochner v. New York").
66 See, e.g., Lucas v. Colo. Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
67 Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
68 Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
69 Harper, 383 U.S. at 686 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See generally Pamela S. Karlan,
Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33
McGEORGE L. REV. 473, 479 (2002).
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Without doubt, these rulings were more political theory than constitutional
interpretation. It was for this reason that Justice Harlan's dissent in Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections invoked Lochner and observed that the
Constitution does not "rigidly impose upon America an ideology of
unrestrained egalitarianism." 70 Curiously, Justice Douglas's majority opinion
responded by invoking Lochner as well. Citing Justice Holmes's famous
dissent, the opinion purported to disavow the notion that the Equal Protection
Clause might be "shackled to the political theory of a particular era."71 And
yet, the opinion's reading of the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit a state poll
tax seemed to rest on the very error Justice Holmes thought the Lochner
majority had committed.
Justice Douglas's opinion in Harper, however, makes more sense if
Lochner's error lay not in the decision's activism or in its untethered approach
to constitutional interpretation, but instead in its assumption that the challenged
regulations displaced "neutral" practices rather than "existing distributions of
wealth and entitlements." 72 Harper (and Reynolds and the related decisions)
made no analogous assumption. The electoral rules the Warren Court
confronted in these cases entrenched and effectively immunized the racial
entitlements that defined the Jim Crow South. There was nothing neutral about
that baseline. 73 True, there was also nothing neutral about the new rules - call
them theories - the Warren Court decisions crafted to disrupt those racial
entitlements. 74 But whatever criticism the Warren Court deserves for
promulgating them, and it has received plenty, its project was analytically
distinct from that of the Lochner Court.
Citizens United, Arizona Free Enterprise Club, and Shelby County stand
more squarely within the Lochner tradition. Unlike the Warren Court holdings,
these decisions not only disrupted existing entitlements, but disrupted them in
order to restore displaced ones. All three scrapped regulatory efforts the Court
viewed as impermissibly disruptive of the balance of power that would have
otherwise prevailed. They did so envisioning an electoral process in which
there would be no unjustified windfalls, unearned advantages, or rules that
otherwise unfairly favored particular constituencies. All three decisions,
moreover, assumed that electoral process would exist but for the challenged
regulations.
70 Harper, 383 U.S. at 686 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 669.
72 Sunstein, supra note 9, at 882.
1 See generally Cheryl I. Harris, In the Shadow of Plessy, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 867
(2005).
74 See Jack M. Balkin, The Roots of the Living Constitution, 92 B.U. L. REv. 1129, 1152
(2012) (observing that while "the reapportionment cases had little precedent in judicial
reasoning, they meshed well with the new role of federal judges as defenders of democracy
as opposed to defenders of property rights and federalism").
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CONCLUSION
There is plenty wrong with the electoral process today. We face daunting
problems that we are unlikely to overcome anytime soon. And yet, the
Constitution is not to blame for our predicament. Instead, a good deal of
contemporary electoral dysfunction stems from the distinct perspective with
which the Roberts Court has approached efforts to regulate the electoral
process. This perspective turns out to be a familiar one. We have seen it before.
